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SELECTED ISSUES OF CLIENT
REPRESENTATION BY "SPORTS"
LAWYERS UNDER THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
DANIEL L. SHNEIDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay will focus on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In
part because of these rules, agents and attorneys representing clients in
the sports field are no different than the attorneys who represent actors
or actresses, corporate executives, factory workers, or an unemployed
person. An attorney's obligation under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct do not differ regardless of the industry or the client with whom
you serve. However, some of the factual situations do require different
substantive knowledge and discretion. I will not accept, nor do I agree
with the statement that the relationship between an agent and his or her
client does not fall within the traditional Model Rules. That type of
statement lends itself to the artificial creation of differences between
lawyers and a belief that if there is a proscription in the Model Rules, it
does not apply to all of those in the legal field.
II. PROMULGATION OF THE MODEL RULES
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are essentially based upon
what the American Bar Association (ABA) has laid out. These rules are
of no force and effect in and of themselves. Lawyers are primarily regu-
lated by their state Supreme Court or State Bar Associations which have
adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in whole or in part.
A. State Differences
There are significant differences from state to state as to what these
rules are. For example, under Rule 1.6, the ABA suggests that if your
client is about to commit a serious crime and you believe that the action
is going to happen, causing serious harm to another party (including fi-
* Daniel L. Shneidman is an attorney with Shneidman, Myers, Dowling & Blumenfield,
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; J.D. 1958, University of Wisconsin.
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nancial harm) you may disclose the nature of the crime.' However, Rule
1.6 does not identify to whom you may disclose this information. All
that it states is that you may disclose the information.
If you were to practice in the State of Wisconsin or any other state
with a rule that is stronger, you may be compelled to disclose the infor-
mation pertaining to your client being involved in a crime.2 The rule in
Wisconsin is not exactly the same as the ABA's Rule 1.6. Under those
same circumstances in Wisconsin you would have to disclose the infor-
mation. You would be given no choice in the matter.
B. Multi-States Practices
What happens if you are a sports agent and you are dealing in multi-
states? I can suggest this to you. Under Model Rule 8.5, it is not en-
tirely clear under which state's rules you will be regulated. 3 For exam-
ple, if you practice law in a state which gives you discretion to disclose
such information about your client, what happens if your legal services
are also being performed in a state which requires disclosure? Many
lawyers would say that if they were in a situation like this they would
simply withdraw. The Wisconsin rules say that if you are subject to a
jurisdiction that must disclose, withdrawing is insufficient.4
These are just examples of the issues with which lawyerswill often be
confronted. Therefore, it is very important for lawyers to study the rules
of ethics in the states in which they practice to see what the rules in each
state entail and how they should undertake client representations ac-
cording to these rules.
C. The Preamble and Ethics
Most states have adopted the Preamble of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. The Preamble goes beyond mere dollars. There has
been thorough discussion concerning the economic impact of attorneys'
services on taxation and client representations. There is often some sug-
gestion that the issue of ethics may be merely academic. I disagree with
this suggestion. For purposes of analogy, I do not perceive anyone to be
merely a plumber who has a higher hourly rate, or merely an insurance
broker who has a different type of degree. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct do separate non-lawyers from lawyers for a valid pur-
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 (1992).
2. Wis. STAT. ANN., S.C. RULES § 20:1.6 (1994).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 8.5 (1992).
4. Wis. STAT. ANN., S.C. RULES § 20:1.16 (1994).
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pose. But I do not believe that it is merely academic to be licensed to
practice a profession. That privilege comes with responsibilities. One of
these responsibilities is to know the rules of professional conduct.
Furthermore, I respectfully differ with the statement that, "Ethics get
in the way of being a sports agent." From my experience of being a
lawyer and dealing with professional conduct or misconduct, if being a
lawyer is being a sports agent or sports lawyer, and the focus is exclu-
sively money, you are doomed. Such a lawyer or agent will get into
trouble because he or she will take shortcuts during their representation.
And there will never be enough money to satisfy them.
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR ATTORNEYS
A. Fees
It is important to recognize that most states have adopted the rule
that fees must be reasonable. There are about eight criteria in the rules
as to what defines a reasonable fee.5
I suggest that the idea of a percentage rate, instead of an hourly rate,
is not foreign. In 1986, the ABA adopted a formal opinion suggesting
that prior to agreement with a client, the client should be offered a
hourly fee agreement.6 Still, it must be remembered that the basic rule
of a client-attorney relationship is that the client is the one making the
decisions, assuming that the client receives an informed opinion from the
lawyer. In one Supreme Court case involving lawyer fees, Justice Rehn-
quist observed that when establishing fees, clients and lawyers are in a
conflict of interest. Therefore, the statement that a reasonable fee for a
sports agent attorney is $ 300 per hour would be very difficult to argue
against in a vacuum unless there was some empirical data to the
contrary.
But assume that a sports agent was able to accomplish a $ 20 million
deal in 8 hrs of phone conversations with a 4% contingency fee. I submit
that an athlete would make a different judgement as to what is a reason-
able fee in that instance.
I am not trying to advocate cutting fees. I am only trying to suggest a
principle of ethics. Many people who became lawyers probably did not
have the making of the most possible money from their clients very high
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC'r Rule 1.5.
6. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-373 (1993)
(which discusses and in part adopts ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 86-1521 (1986) (which discusses offering an hourly fee agreement to a client
prior to reaching a fee agreement)); Rule 12.8.6.
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on the list of what they were going to accomplish as lawyers. I assume
that there is a positive goal in helping young men and women who are
professional athletes, who may be uninformed on their value in the mar-
ket, or unsophisticated as to investments. I am also assuming that there
are numerous positive things that we as educated individuals can offer to
that kind of client. I am not convinced, however, that the correlation of
the good that we do in affording the services to the client is directly
commensurate with a contingency fee.
I would suggest another look at Model Rule 1.4.7 This rule suggests
that a lawyer should explain a matter fully enough to allow a client to
make informed decisions regarding his representation.
B. Competence
Lawyers really are schizoid, by definition. I know of no other profes-
sion which demands the following: (1) loyalty to your client; (2) duty to
courts and the judicial system; (3) duty to society; (4) duty to yourself,
your family and your loved ones. How do you balance that? The license
you retained gives you the opportunity to challenge those conflicts in
your life. And it gives you the opportunity to meet those challenges
which may often overrule a decision you would make regarding the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
You would be surprised to know that prior to 1970 there was no af-
firmative duty for American lawyers to be competent. We are not talk-
ing about malpractice. We are talking about a duty to a judicial system,
to a client, and to yourself, to be competent. Competence is defined by
legal knowledge, skill, thorough verse, and preparations. It is not neces-
sary to define this fully. What will follow are a few hypotheticals to em-
phasize this point.
Assume that a professional football player in 1993 tells you his wife is
due to deliver a baby on September 15. The date arrives and the player
says that he wants to be with his wife, and he leaves. The general man-
ager of the team calls you. As the attorney for the football player, or the
team, what advice would you give to each party if the player was fined or
fired?
The Family Medical Leave Act states that given a thirty day notice,
the player is entitled to such a leave, unless he is one of the key players.8
As the attorney to the player you may opt to inform him of his vested
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.4 (1992).
8. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et. seq.
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right-under the statute. The team is liable, not only for wages lost, but
also for liquidated damages, interest on lost wages, attorney's fees, and
any other equitable remedy. I would suggest that the duty of being a
competent representative includes the discussion with your client of the
Family Medical Leave Act.
Approximately twenty states have adopted this Act.9 A small provi-
sion in the Federal statute says something to the effect that nothing en-
acted here will supersede state laws dealing with the same subject
matter.10 So, not only do you have to know the federal law, but you
must also know any applicable state laws to determine which statute
gives you the greater benefits, not only in terms of the length of the
leave, but also in terms of the other indicated benefits.
As a further example, assume that under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) there is a provision providing for a sick leave." The
statute specifically allows substitution, which means that the athlete can
say, "I want December 15 as my leave, and I want to substitute that
amount of money which I have accrued under the CBA or my personal
labor agreement to apply to the time I have chosen for the leave."
There are no cases on this point. The statute became effective in
August of 1993.12 Actually, it was to become active in August 1993, or
the first date following the expiration of the next CBA.13 So in the hypo-
thetical it should be assumed that a CBA was negotiated. Regardless,
the principle remains the same in terms of what and to what degree your
competence should be. The point is that there is a basic level your com-
petence must achieve.
It is my belief that you are obligated under the duty of professional-
ism to know the contents of the Civil Rights Act and Title VII Amend-
ments to this Act,14 the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter
ADA),'5 the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,16 and the Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act.17 These are all important Acts and it would
probably take an extensive period of time to discuss these Acts and the
responses a lawyer or agent would give as counsel for either the em-
9. Id.
10. Id. at § 2651.
11. Id
12. Im. at § 2601.
13. Id.
14. The Civil Rights Act Of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000 et. seq.
15. The Americans With Disabilities Act Of 1990, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2112-14.
16. The Federal Rehabilitation Act Of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.
17. The Age Discrimination In Employment Act Of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.
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ployer, or employee in the further hypotheticals contained in the
appendix.
Lastly, assume that you have filed a case in federal court. You are
talking negotiations with the club owner or club counsel. What issues do
you talk about? Assume that you come to a number (i.e., for salary,
benefits, bonuses, etc.) for your client's contract. That is not enough.
There are still issues on taxability.
The hypothetical I use is of a fifty four (54) year old African Ameri-
can, gay, diabetic. A lawyer or agent should know that the current state
of the law on the taxability of settlement awards from age discrimination
cases comes from a 1993 tax court decision. It was a split decision but
the majority opinion suggests that such a settlement award is not taxa-
ble. However, a week later, a District Court in Florida decided that such
settlement awards were taxable. The issue is still up in the air.
Moreover, two Acts can also apply to this situation: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, and the ADA, which states that any damages or settle-
ments are not taxable.18 In the end, when a lawyer or agent structures
the resolution to a similar type of litigation that arises out of their pro-
fessional representation, they must know taxation for their representa-
tion to be competent.
I am not attempting to add on to the volume of knowledge that there
is on taxation, but I do want to point out that counting dollars and sim-
ply getting the largest amount of money for your client in negotiations
does not mean that your representation has ended. Unless that is all you
want to be. Unless you simply say to your athlete client, or proposed
client, "I will do nothing but negotiate your contract."
I think that lawyers and agents must learn that almost every issue
they are involved in will touch on many different areas of the law, i.e.
even signing bonuses will have some tax impact. A lawyer's goal or
quest must be to learn as much as they can about many different areas of
the law, and that goal may never end.
C. Solicitation
The last topic is solicitation. Perhaps the largest number of inquiries
I get from lawyers and agents are "How can I solicit clients?" Solicita-
tion is no longer a dirty word. In the past, had I been asked a question
similar to, "Can I go talk to Frank Thomas or some other current ath-
18. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2114.
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lete," saying, "I want to be your agent?" Up until February of 1993, I
would have said "No." Now I am not so sure.
Appendix E contains a very short description of the history of lawyer
solicitation and advertising. That history is essentially a lecture on con-
stitutional law which will not be repeated here. However, lawyers
should be aware that in February of 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court issued
a decision involving a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). 19 This CPA
was a very successful practitioner in New Jersey. He went from door to
door saying, "Hi, my name is John Doe and I specialize in representing
small employers and small corporations." When he moved to Florida he
wanted to do the same thing. However, Florida, similar to 20 other
states, has specific laws prohibiting in-person solicitation. In the case,
the United States Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1 decision said that the
Florida rule was overbroad.2 0 What was really significant in the Florida
decision was that it discussed the cornerstone decision of the Ohralik
case.
21
What I believe the Supreme Court did in this case was to explain the
real reason why the court found Ohralik's actions so unconscionable.
Ohralik was a case in which a lawyer went to a hospital with a nearly
comatose patient and was able to get the patient to sign a contingency,
retainer agreement for a personal injury case. In the present case the
Court went out of its way to say that it had decided Ohralik very nar-
rowly under those specific circumstances 22 The Court went on to say
that it did not intend for all professional services to be impacted by the
way the Ohralik case was decided.3 In large part from this case I would
come to several conclusions concerning solicitation.
In analyzing these conclusion it must be realized that there is a pres-
ent rule in the Model Rules that precludes in-person solicitation.24 The
State of Wisconsin has adopted a form of this rule in its Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, and most likely, nearly every state in the nation has
some form of this rule.25 A very strong argument can and will be made
concerning solicitation and a sophisticated client; whether it is a bank, or
a business person, or an athlete who has an established record in dealing
with lawyers, owners, accountants and investors. A sophisticated client
19. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (1993).
20. 1d.
21. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
22. Edenfield, 113 S.Ct. at 1795.
23. Id.
24. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 73 (1992).
25. Wis. STAT. ANN., S.C. RULES § 20:7.3 (1994).
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is not the type of person who will be taken advantage of by an in-person
telephonic communication.
According to the Model Rules, you can send a letter to all of the
athletes in the world as long as you label it advertisement. Now, if you
say to me, "Well Dan, are you saying that there are at the present time
American Bar Association rules which are unconstitutional and inva-
lid?" The answer is unequivocally, "Yes!"
In the appendix there is a reference to Rule 7.4.26 This rule prohibits
a lawyer from announcing to the consumer public what their area of spe-
cialization is. In 1990, the United States Supreme Court in a split deci-
sion ruled that an Illinois rule which was comparable to Model Rule 7.4
was unconstitutional.2 7 Therefore, for several years the American Bar
Association has kept on the books a rule which is clearly unconstitu-
tional and unenforceable. Every state probably has rules that are com-
parable to Rule 7.4. These rules would prohibit a lawyer from even
suggesting language that states to the public that their practice is limited
to representing athletes, or limited to representing people in the sports
industry. All such rules are unenforceable.
What has happened is that the ABA, for the last few years, has been
attempting to restudy the area of specialization and the impact it has on
advertising. As a result, in the next few years there will probably be a
new Rule 7.4. Each state will then have to allow all attorneys to adver-
tise their particular area of specialization.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, it must also be realized that specialization is something that
will be allowed only if the lawyer can fulfill some objective criteria to
justify the specialization. In other words, it will not be enough to simply
have the Beverly Hills Bar Association say, "Give us $100 and we will
certify you as a domestic relations specialist." The criteria will have to
be established by the ABA and each particular state. The ABA is cur-
rently studying various lawyer groups who will seek accreditation for dif-
ferent specialty areas.
26. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 7.4 (1992).
27. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 2281
(1990).
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APPENDIX A
Every man is the creature of the age in which he lives;
very few are able to raise themselves above the ideas of
the time.
Voltaire
I. SELECTED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
RULE 1.1
Competence
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
RULE 1.2
Scope of Representation
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives
of representation, subject to paragraphs (c),(d) and (e) and shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept
an offer of settlement of a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer
shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the law-
yer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive a jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by ap-
pointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's polit-
ical, economic, social or moral views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client
consents after consultation.
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of con-
duct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application
of the law.
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client expects assistance not permitted
by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall
consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the law-
yer's conduct.
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RULE 1.4
Communication
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of
a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
RULE 1.5
Fees
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of
the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis
or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in
writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the
representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is
prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agree-
ment shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee
is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that
shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal,
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and
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whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contin-
gent fee is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter,
the lawyer shall provide the client with a written statement stating
the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the
remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount
of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon
the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu
thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm
may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer as-
sumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of
all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
RULE 7.1
Communications Concerning a Lawyer's Services
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the
lawyer or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading
if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact
necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materi-
ally misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results
by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with the other lawyers' services, un-
less the comparison can be factually substantiated.
RULE 7.2
Advertising
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may adver-
tise services through public media, such as a telephone directory,
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legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, outdoor advertising,
radio or telephone, or through written or recorded communication.
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication
shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination along with a
record of when and where it was used.
(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recom-
mending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may
(1) pay the reasonable costs of advertising or written communica-
tion permitted by this Rule;
(2) pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyers referral service
or legal service organization; and
(3) pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17.
(d) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the
name of at least one lawyer responsible for its content.
RULE 7.3
Direct Contact with Prospective Clients
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit pro-
fessional employment from a prospective client with whom the law-
yer has no family or prior professional relationship when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain.
(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospec-
tive client by written or recorded communication or by in-person or
telephone contact when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (a),
if;
(1) the prospective client has made known to the lawyer a desire
not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
(c) Every written or recorded communication from a lawyer soliciting
professional employment from a prospective client known to be in
need of legal services in a particular matter, and with whom the law-
yer has no family or prior professional relationship, shall include the
words "Advertising Material" on the outside envelope and at the
beginning and ending of any recorded communication.
(d) Notwithstanding the prohibitions in paragraph (a), a lawyer may
participate with a prepaid or group legal service plan operated by an
organization not owned or directed by the lawyer which uses in-per-
son or telephone contact to solicit memberships or subscriptions for
the plan from persons who are not known to need legal services in a
particular matter covered by the plan.
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RULE 7.4 [*But see Peel decision, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990)].
Communication of Fields of Practice
A lawyer may communicate the fact that the lawyer does or does not
practice in particular fields of law. A lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is a specialist except as follows:
(a) a lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United
States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation "Patent
Attorney" or a substantially similar designation;
(b) a lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may use the designation
"Admiralty", "Proctor in Admiralty" or a substantially similar
designation; and
(c) [provisions on designation of specialization of the particular states].
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APPENDIX B
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MODEL RULES
In 1908, the ABA adopted the original Cannons of Professional Eth-
ics which were principally based on a code of ethics adopted by the Ala-
bama Bar Association in 1887, which were adopted liberally from the
lectures of George Sharswood, a 19th Century legal scholar. In 1964, the
ABA House of Delegates created a special committee to determine
whether changes should be made in the then existing Cannons of Profes-
sional Ethics. In 1969, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
was adopted by the House of Delegates and subsequently adopted by
numerous states. In 1977, the ABA created the Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards, and ultimately determined that merely
amending the Model Code of Professional Responsibility would not ade-
quately address issues then governing the legal profession; the Commis-
sion then began a six year study which resulted in the House of
Delegates of the ABA adopting the current Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. CAVEAT TO ALL ATTORNEYS: Your state bar associa-
tion or supreme court may not have adopted all of the Rules verbatim.
Lawyers' professional conduct will generally be reviewed within those
Rules established by the jurisdiction in which the lawyer practices.
[Vol. 4.129
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APPENDIX C
PREAMBLE TO THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1. A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal sys-
tem, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice.
2. As advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed under-
standing of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains
their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously as-
serts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.
As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client,
but consistent with requirements of honest dealing with others.
A lawyer acts as evaluator by examining a client's legal affairs
and reporting about them to the client or to others.
3. In all professional matters, a lawyer should be competent,
prompt and diligent and maintain communication with a client
concerning the representation, and keep in confidence informa-
tion relating to the client's representation, except as either re-
quired or permitted under the Model Rules or other law.
4. In addition to the substantive and procedural law, a lawyer is also
guided by personal conscience and approbation of professional
peers and should strive to attain the highest level of skills, to im-
prove the law and the legal profession.
5. Lawyers may confront conflicting responsibilities in the course of
their representation. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provide a framework of rules that can assist the lawyer in resolv-
ing such conflicts. However, it is recognized that difficult issues
require professional discretion, and that such discretion may re-
quire the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgement
guided by the basic principals underlying the Model Rules.
6. Sharswood, supra, commenting on the standards in defining the
appropriate role of the lawyer in society said:
High morale principle is the lawyer's only safe guide, the only
torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction" Rus-
sell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the
Legal Ethics Codes, VI GEORGETOWN J. OF LEGAL ETHics
241, No. 2 (1992).
1993]
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APPENDIX D
HYPOTHETICALS
Example 1: A professional male athlete under a collective bargaining
agreement advises his general manager in October, 1993, that his wife is
pregnant and expects to deliver a baby on or about December 15, 1993,
and requests a leave on or about that date. Assume further that the
"season" will still be going on and the athlete's contract would normally
contemplate the completion of the season. The general manager is a
"blood and guts" type, and is livid and wants to suspend, fine or dis-
charge the athlete.
If the general manager consults you as the attorney for the club, what
advice, if any, do you give the general manager? What advice do you
give the general manager if the general manager has the authority to and
has already fined the athlete?
Assuming you are the attorney for the athlete, what advice, if any, do
you give to the athlete either prior to or subsequent to the general man-
ager's fine?
Example 2: Assume that a professional club has an assistant coach
who is a fifty four (54) year old gay diabetic who is an African American.
The head coach and general manager have told you, as counsel for the
club, that they want to terminate him because they don't like his attitude
and he rubs them the wrong way (figuratively speaking). Assuming you
are representing the club, what advice do you give the coach and general
manager? What kind of information do you seek to elicit? Assuming
you are counsel to the assistant coach, what advice do you give to him?
What information do you elicit?
Example 3: Assume a federal court action has been commenced by
the assistant coach referred to in example 2 and counsel for the athlete
and club are engaged in settlement discussions. In addition to the
amount of dollars, what other factors are relevant to your consideration
in the negotiations, regardless of whether you are representing the club
or the employee?
Example 4: Assume that you presently do not represent any of the
parties in discussion hypothetical 1 or 2, and assume that you would like
to; how, if at all, can you ethically solicit such representation?
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APPENDIX E
CASES AND OTHER RULES TO FOLLOW
A. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), held that commercial speech is entitled to
limited first amendment protection.
B. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), upheld a
state's right to regulate lawyer advertising that is false, deceptive or
misleading.
C. In In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), Justice Powell held that:
Commercial speech doctrine, in the context of advertising for pro-
fessional services, may be summarized generally as follows: truth-
ful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently
misleading, or when experience has proved that in fact such ad-
vertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose appropriate
restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.
But the states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information... if the information
also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive ... Although
the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in
the context of advertising professional services, restrictions upon
such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to
prevent the deception.
455 U.S. at 191.
D. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), up-
held a lawyer discipline case involving a lawyer who approached an in-
jured automobile driver while she was lying in the hospital and secured a
contingent fee agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the disci-
pline of the lawyer for in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain. The
court confirmed Ohio's interest in preventing in-person solicitation as
"particularly strong" indicating the state's responsibility for maintaining
professional standards and preventing solicitation that involves "fraud,
intimidation, overreaching and other forms of vexatious conduct." 436
U.S. at 462.
E. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), decided the same day as
Ohralik, supra, involved an ACLU lawyer writing to a potential client to
inform her of her legal rights and to offer her legal representation with-
out fee. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme
Court discipline of the lawyer and held that the state's application of its
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no solicitation rules violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
solicitation in the Primus case involved associational freedoms protected
by the First Amendment, and thus afforded a higher degree of protec-
tion to political speech, and required the state to prove a compelling
interest.
F. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), involved a lawyer's newspaper advertise-
ment that publicized his willingness to represent women who were alleg-
edly injured by using the Dalcon shield intrauterine device. The
Supreme Court rejected the Ohio court's reprimand of the lawyer for
use of an illustration in the newspaper ad as violating the lawyer's First
Amendment rights. Justice White said:
The state's power to prohibit advertising that is 'inherently mis-
leading' ... cannot justify Ohio's decision to discipline appellant
for running advertising geared to persons with a specific legal
problem.
436 U.S. at 455. The court continued to recognize the difference be-
tween print advertisement and a personal encounter between the lawyer
and client since the client would have more opportunity to consider the
representation upon review of printed advertisement, as contrasted to
personal solicitation.
G. In Shapiro v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), the
lawyer sent direct mail letters to persons not his clients whose property
was being foreclosed. In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court
ruled that the First Amendment does not allow states to allow blanket
bans on targeted direct mail solicitation 6f potential clients. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the court majority, rejected the argument that
Shapiro was merely "Ohralik in writing," and said that:
The mode of communication makes all the difference and that
print advertising does not pose the risk of overreaching that a
lawyer's personal presence would have.
486 U.S. 470.
H. In Peel v. Attorney, Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990), the United States Supreme Court, in a
four, two, one and three plurality decision reversed the Illinois Supreme
Court decision to reprimand Attorney Peel. The plurality opinion by
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy,
assumed the lawyer's letterhead was entitled to application of the com-
mercial free speech doctrine, as established in the Bates case, supra.
Justice Stevens observed that the "facts" stated on the lawyer's letter-
head were true and verifiable, and observed that neither bar associations
[Vol. 4:129
1993] SELECTED ISSUES OF CLIENT REPRESENTATION 147
nor states may rely upon an argument that the consuming public will be
mislead by the juxtaposition of the lawyer's assertion of certification and
licensure. In essence, the court struck down Rule 7.4 and any state at-
tempt to regulate the advertising of specialization.
I. In 1993, the ABA, after intensive study, recommended the
following:
Be it resolved that:
A lawyer shall not hold him/herself out publicly as a certified spe-
cialist, except as follows:
1. A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of
law by an organization that has been accredited by the Amer-
ican Bar Association may hold him/herself out as a specialist
certified by the (named) organization.
2. A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular field of
law by - (state bar or specialization program), or by an
organization that has been approved by - (the same
state), or an organization that has been accredited by the
American Bar Association, may hold him/herself out as a cer-
tified "specialist by the certifying organization. (STATES
MAY ADOPT ONE OR TWO.)
J. TEXAS LAWYERS SPECIAL ATTENTION: Texas makes law-
yer solicitation a felony-see MARK HANSEN, Texas Makes Solicita-
tion a Felony, September ABA JOURNAL 32 (1993).
K. Current speech, commercial free speech, and lawyer solicitation.
In Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S.Ct. 1792 (1993), the court struck down a
Florida restriction on certified public accountants solicitation of clients
by either telephone or personal contact. The Florida rule provided that
a CPA:
Shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation, solicit
an engagement to perform public accounting services... where
the engagement would be for a person or entity not already a
client of the CPA unless such person or entity has invited such a
communication.
Florida Administrative Code, § 21A-24.002(2)(c), 1992. The regulation
continued:
Direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation means 'any communi-
cation which directly or implicitly requests an immediate oral re-
sponse from the recipient' which, under the Board's rules, include
all 'uninvited in-person visits or conversations or telephone calls
to a specific potential client'."
§ 21A-24.002(3). CPA Fane was a New Jersey practitioner specializing in
providing tax advice to small and medium size businesses. He had previ-
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ously solicited business clients by making unrequested telephone calls to
the executives and arranging meetings to explain his services and exper-
tise. New Jersey law did not prohibit such practice. For the most current
opinion of the court's view towards professional (including lawyers) so-
licitation of perspective clients, see Fane. Perhaps, under appropriate
factual circumstances, the window of opportunity for in-person lawyer
solicitation of perspective clients is "open a crack."
